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India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of
Transnational Militant Threats
Abstract
Militant groups hiding in Myanmar launch cross-border attacks into India, killing soldiers
and civilians. The Indian Army has responded by launching cross-border military incursions
into Burmese territory. After decades of trial and failure to curb the militants, a
reciprocated spirit of cooperation for the first time seems to characterize India and
Myanmar’s joint efforts in fighting them. This article analyses the evolution of these efforts
and argues that a sum of dovetailing drivers have created space for enhancing
countermilitancy cooperation in an ambivalent and distrustful relationship. Central
elements are an overall improvement in bilateral relations, India’s need to counter China’s
growing influence in its neighbourhood, Myanmar’s urge to diversify its benefactors, the
urgency of stabilizing India’s northeast, Myanmar’s domestic security calculations, as well
as a large untapped economic cooperation potential. Despite increasing countermilitancy
cooperation, difficult challenges remain as Myanmar has ceasefire agreements with Indiahostile militants residing on its territory. The relationship is caught in a complex interstate
order in a mix of conflict and cooperation, between the use of extraterritorial force and its
acceptance.
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ABSTRACT
Militant groups hiding in Myanmar launch cross-border attacks into
India, killing soldiers and civilians. The Indian Army has responded by
launching cross-border military incursions into Burmese territory. After
decades of trial and failure to curb the militants, a reciprocated spirit of
cooperation for the first time seems to characterize India and Myanmar’s
joint efforts in fighting them. This article analyses the evolution of
these efforts and argues that a sum of dovetailing drivers have created
space for enhancing countermilitancy cooperation in an ambivalent and
distrustful relationship. Central elements are an overall improvement in
bilateral relations, India’s need to counter China’s growing influence in its
neighborhood, Myanmar’s urge to diversify its benefactors, the urgency
of stabilizing India’s northeast, Myanmar’s domestic security calculations,
as well as a large untapped economic cooperation potential. Despite
increasing countermilitancy cooperation, difficult challenges remain as
Myanmar has ceasefire agreements with India-hostile militants residing on
its territory. The relationship is caught in a complex interstate order in a
mix of conflict and cooperation, between the use of extraterritorial force
and its acceptance.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the drivers behind the upsurge in Indo-Burmese countermilitancy cooperation after decades of disengagement? The areas along
the 1,643 km India–Myanmar border have since the 1950s been a scene of
ethno-nationalist-driven, low-intensity conflict, deteriorating the state-tostate relationship. Cooperation in fighting transnational militant groups
and Burmese attempts at curbing India-hostile militants for decades has
been lukewarm, at best. Their relationship has despite periodical and
partial upswings been characterized by disengagement and distrust,
even hostility.1 In early 2017, Indian Assamese police forces assessed that
2,500 Indian militants were residing in sanctuaries in Myanmar.2 A further
complicating matter is that the Burmese have a ceasefire agreement with
militants that actively launch cross-border attacks into Indian Territory,
and once were a shared security threat. India, on its side, no longer seems
to host anti-Burmese militants.
Despite this severe and continuing challenge, in recent years a spirit of
cooperation has appeared as a more prominent feature in Indo-Burmese
counter-militancy cooperation for the first time. In the past decade,
the two states have signed comprehensive cooperative agreements on
intelligence, border patrolling, as well as initiated exchange programs and
joint exercises on counter-militancy.3
Grounded partly in a growing literature seeking to explain militant impacts
on interstate relations and existing literature on India–Myanmar relations,
this article furthers expectations regarding the drivers of increased IndoBurmese counter-militancy cooperation. Examining the drivers of enhanced
cooperation in an ambivalent interstate relationship despite resilient
militancy and a long conflict provides nuances significant for understanding
the complicated dynamics of the regional great power–small power IndoBurmese relations. It throws light on the impact of militancy on a complex
interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation.
The following section generates assumptions about the drivers of countermilitancy cooperation, before providing a status of counter-militancy
cooperation in the Indo-Burmese dyad. This is followed by an explanation
of the cooperation, and finally, a conclusion.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DRIVERS
Four central and intertwined categories of drivers that regulate the
impact of transnational militancy on interstate relations are: The
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673
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historical and present nature of the interstate relationship; the base
state and target states’ relations with third-party states; perceptions
of the security threat including the agenda of the militant groups; and,
finally, economic cooperation including expectations for the future.4 The
assumed drivers of Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation provide
structure to the analysis.
First, counter-militancy cooperation is part of the overall progress in
Indo-Burmese relations. Even though ambivalence still characterizes the
relationship, it has seen general improvement in the 2010s. New Delhi,
which for long supported the Burmese democratic opposition, and
Myanmar’s transition to quasi-democracy in the last decade, have made
cooperation easier, despite the democratic letdown in Myanmar. India
has offered US$500 million for Burmese development projects, there are
grand intensions of strategic economic cooperation, collaboration on
maritime security, and high-level visits have rocketed.5 In addition, costly
and sensitive military-to-military contact may serve as an entry point to
improve relations further.
Therefore, understanding the nature of the interstate relationship is of
the essence. In doing this, it is essential to note the power imbalance in
relations. India has a nuclear capacity and in recent years has emerged
as a regional great power. Myanmar is a small power struggling with its
national security and economy. This may regulate how the host state and
target state relate to one another in the context of militancy and impact
the use of force and the acceptance of such.
Second, a driver that can lead to change in an interstate relationship is
a third-party state. Balancing against China, an increasingly assertive
regional and global great power and India’s rival, is the primary factor
scholars ascribe to the overall empowerment of the India–Myanmar
relationship. The China factor is central and feeds into the countermilitancy cooperation both in a contextual and direct sense. Although
transnational militancy has been a threat since the colonial period,
fighting it is now strategically more important for New Delhi as China’s
involvement in the neighborhood is increasing in light of its Belt and Road
Initiative unveiled in 2013. To counter growing Chinese influence, India
in 2014 launched the Act East policy aiming to gain more influence and
connectivity with ASEAN6 states and beyond. In Act East, India’s regional
security role was a heavier component compared to its predecessor,
the Look East policy.7 There are also other external actors influencing
Indo-Burmese relations, such as India’s archrival and neighbor Pakistan.
Pakistan plays a critical role for India’s security, and its close alliance
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with China amplifies Indian concerns. Moreover, changes in relations with
neighbors, such as India’s relations with Bangladesh and Bhutan, as well as
Myanmar’s relations with China, Pakistan and the international community,
may influence Indo-Burmese counter-militancy collaboration.
Third, the target and host states’ security considerations directly regulate
the way they behave vis-à-vis one another in the context of transnational
militant attacks. Most studies focus on the target state, although the
host state’s security perceptions are also central in understanding
interstate counter-militancy cooperation.8 This article also includes the
agenda of the main militant group, the National Socialist Council of
Nagalim-Khaplang (NSCN-K). The host and target states’ relations with
the militants are significant in explaining interstate counter-militancy
interactions.9 The growing importance of Myanmar in India’s strategic
priorities and its concurrent assertiveness is aligned with Myanmar’s
security calculations. India and Myanmar do not necessarily have an equal
interest in defeating transnational militancy, nor is it in Myanmar’s interest
to create an unprofitable gap in its relations with China. However, it may
be easier for Myanmar to let India handle the problem at the border, as it
is facing worse pressure in its other border areas.
Fourth, economic cooperation in the relationship may regulate the impact
of militancy, and more so if the economic cooperation is of a strategic
nature.10 In addition to existing economic interests, this article also takes
the potential for expanding such cooperation. Because of growing Indian
economic power and assertiveness, combined with a reaction to Beijing’s
regional investments through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, New
Delhi has launched a countering Act East policy. Act East includes an
economic corridor eastwards with Myanmar as its gateway. Naypyidaw’s
opening to foreign investors, and, ironically, the recent condemnation by
the international community of the minority Muslim Rohingya’s exodus
and massacre, has increasingly allowed this development.
These new dynamics have created, in sum, a new strategic environment
for India and Myanmar, aligned their interests, and generated incentives for
seeking costly and sensitive interstate counter-militancy cooperation despite
continuous conflict-inflicting transnational militancy.11 The two states have so
far landed somewhere between fixing and managing the problem.

TRANSNATIONAL MILITANCY
AND COOPERATION
India’s Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram states border
Myanmar’s Kachin state, Sagaing Division and Chin state. Rakhine state,
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673
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where India has large-scale strategic and economic interests, is situated
just south of Chin state, and borders Bangladesh. The Indo-Burmese
border areas are home to a myriad of ethnic groups, which of many have
led insurgencies aiming for increased autonomy against both India and
Myanmar. In 2016 alone, groups hiding in neighboring Myanmar primarily
conducted 50 violent incidents in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh
and 58 incidents in the state of Nagaland.12 In early 2017, it was reported
that about 1.000 Indian militants residing in Myanmar belong to the
National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Khaplang (NSCN-K).13
The militants are sub or extra-national groups that use or threaten to
use violence in order to fulfil separatist or ideological ambitions. The
main militant group studied in this article, NSCN-K, strives for its own
independent state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. The
militants hide across borders, launch cross-border attacks, or target
domestic landmarks, infrastructure, or people that are important to the
target or host state. They may have friendly or hostile relations to the host
state, or the host state may lack capacity to control them, and they may
enjoy third-party sponsorship.
Transnational militancy, referring to militant actions that affect both India
and Myanmar, has significantly deteriorated relations. It has nonetheless
also produced cooperative counter-measures. Two types of countermilitancy cooperation are identified in the ambivalent relationship: Direct
counter-militancy cooperation and the host state’s pragmatic acceptance
of the target state’s countermeasures. India and Myanmar engaged in
direct, yet limited, counter-militancy cooperation in the post-colonial
period. It was not until the late 2010s, however, that such cooperation
started gaining ground.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, India and Myanmar cooperated in
countering insurgency in form of limited arms and aircraft supplies, and
curbing Naga insurgents’ demand for autonomy in the border areas.14
In 1967, they signed a border agreement in light of their borderlands’
restiveness and had limited collaboration on counter-militancy operations
around the same time.15 In the mid-1990s, the two states agreed on
the intention of increasing cooperation and preventing insurgency and
crime, and the Indian Army Chief visited Myanmar.16 They launched a
number of counter-militancy operations in following years aimed at
curbing India-hostile militant organizations, where Burmese forces for
instance contributed by blocking the militants’ escape routes. However,
this cooperation was not in full coordination or agreement, and Burmese
efforts were sporadic and lacked effective border security regimes.17 The
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joint efforts did not stop cross-border militant attacks from Burmese
territory into India. Nonetheless, the security situation did improve in the
following years.18 A significant factor in this improvement was India and
Myanmar’s ceasefire agreements with several militant groups.
India is believed to have supplied Myanmar with transport helicopters,
armored personnel carriers, light guns, and tanks for countering militancy
during the 2000s.19 Furthermore, intending to simplify movement for
hill tribes residing in the border areas, India’s Home Ministry and the
government of Myanmar introduced a limited visa-free movement regime
in the border areas in 2010, meaning, “local nationals of both sides can
stay in the other country for three days within 16 km on either side.”20
According to Lionel M. Beehner, the agreement implies that India can
pursue Indian rebels into Burmese territory.21 What it also signifies is free
roaming for militants. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh stated that it
“is misused by militants and criminals who smuggle weapons,
narcotics, contraband goods, and Fake Indian Currency Notes.
Taking advantage of the free-movement regime occasionally
they, in other words the militants, enter India, commit crimes,
and escape to their relatively safer hide-outs.”22
In recent years, counter-militancy cooperation has made unmatched
progress. In 2015, the two countries agreed on more coordinated security
arrangements, allowing for enhanced patrolling coordination and crossborder intelligence sharing.23 In addition, the Indian Army trains Burmese
soldiers in counter-militancy.24 For instance, a Myanmar Army contingent
trained at the India Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in
Mizoram in late 2017.25 In November 2017, India and Myanmar carried out
their first joint military exercise, IMBAX-2017, at the Joint Warfare Centre
in Meghalaya, India.26
Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation is dual-faced. Besides direct
cooperation, Naypyidaw and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces,
have pragmatically accepted India’s sovereignty-breaching moves.
While India has increased its presence in its northeast and successfully
established deals with many militants, other groups – such as the NSCN-K,
the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), and the
Coordination Committee (CorCom)– remain active. They allegedly hide
in Burmese territory and conduct cross-border strikes targeting Indian
soldiers, particularly in the Indian provinces of Manipur and Nagaland.
In recent years, Bangladesh and Bhutan have largely ceased to function as
a safe haven for India-hostile militants, and Bhutan has a comprehensive
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673
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security agreement with India.27 The consequence is that non-signatory
militant groups increasingly depend on cross-border sanctuaries on
Burmese territory for survival, and allegedly also on Chinese territory.28
Applying terrorist tactics, the militants launch cross-border attacks on
the Indian Army and civilians. Naypyidaw’s 2012 ceasefire agreement with
NSCN-K limits Burmese security force presence in the group’s territory.29
This access to extraterritorial sanctuary has secured the effectiveness
of the militants and limited India’s room for maneuver in securing its
strategically important northeast.30 The challenge is amplified by the
fact that, for the Burmese, the cost of curbing the India-hostile militants
is likely lower than the benefit. Myanmar has more severe security
challenges involving separatist militants on its borders with China and
Thailand. The Tatmadaw has conducted cross-border raids into Thai
territory and urged China to stop harboring Myanmar-hostile militants,
which have added much tension in these relations.31
The Indian government and the NSCN-K called off their ceasefire
agreement in 2015.32 In June the same year, the Indian army executed
a military hot pursuit into Burmese territory, allegedly killing tens of
Naga militants in their camps. It is believed that the incursion was in
response to militants’ killing of 18 Indian soldiers in a cross-border
strike. The authorities in Myanmar initially denied that the cross-border
operation ever took place. This is an expected reaction considering the
immense importance for any nation of securing national sovereignty,
and specifically pertinent for nations with several power centers such
as Myanmar.33 This type of signaling is seen for instance, in Pakistan’s
denial of Indian cross-border surgical strikes and Iranian cross-border hot
pursuits, both following transnational militancy. In addition, admittedly, the
Burmese government did have a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K.34
In December 2017, Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat controversially
confirmed that Indian troops had crossed the border into Burmese
territory. His statements were not welcomed at a time when the Indian
government was seeking a solution around deporting Muslim Rohingya
refugees who had fled massacre from Myanmar’s Rakhine state.35 Beehner
describes the Indian cross-border incursion as a permissive hot pursuit,
with the Burmese leadership denying tacit acceptance.36 The Indians
followed up with a high-level delegation to Myanmar, but failed to
formalize an agreement allowing military action on Burmese territory.37
Their counterparts in Myanmar referred to the constitution’s article 42b:
“No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of
the Union.”38 According to the Hindu, the Indians were in 2017 considering
asking Myanmar to revoke its ceasefire agreement with NSCN-K, as it,
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among other militant groups, was involved in “anti-India” activities in the
border areas.39 However, it does not seem any progress was made on the
matter, despite the threat.
A high-standing official from India’s ruling party BJP supports Beehner’s
argument on the permissive hot pursuit. According to the official, it is
likely that India did carry out incursions into Myanmar’s territory, although
denied by both states. Moreover, “what is important is that if this is a fact,
India did not carry out these specific-target incursions without consent
from Myanmar’s government.”40 He described increasing cooperation
in fighting transnational militancy, and said that relations had improved
overall. He expected that Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Myanmar
in September 2017 would result in counter-militancy cooperation in areas
other than security. Modi’s agenda did include counter-insurgency talks
and a land-border crossing agreement, which was approved by the Indian
cabinet in January 2018.
In a similar 1995 raid, it was claimed that Indian and Burmese forces carried
out a joint operation. However, in the words of an Indian officer and
researcher who himself had a lead position in the raid; it was an operation
solely under Indian command, with tension between Indian and Burmese
forces.41 This supports the idea of Burmese pragmatic acceptance.
Although much points to the aftermath of India’s cross-border strike as
a case of pragmatic acceptance, it is only rational to not totally dismiss
the option that there was no acceptance from the Burmese side and that
continuing cooperation was the result of a ‘rescue mission’ by the Indian
high-level delegation that travelled to Naypyidaw shortly after. Regardless
of whether the acceptance was pragmatic or forced, as it did not lead to
higher levels of conflict, it illustrates a nuance between cooperation and
conflict in interstate relations. The following section further examines what
has made cooperation possible despite the highly conflict-inflicting factor
of resilient transnational militancy and even breaches of sovereignty.

THE DRIVERS OF INDO-BURMESE
COUNTER-MILITANCY COOPERATION
The following section focus on the four categories of drivers: The nature
of the interstate relationship; the relations with third-party states;
perceptions of the security threat; and economic cooperation.
First, in the India-Burma case one could argue that the dyad has ripened
enough to forge counter-militancy cooperation. However, border and
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673
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counter-militancy cooperation regimes are rare and costly, and most
likely appear in cases where the host and target states share a common
militant enemy.42 The fact that an interstate relationship has improved
does not imply automatic enhancement of counter-militancy cooperation.
An implication is that the nature of the India–Myanmar relationship does
not alone determine whether transnational militancy causes more conflict,
cooperation, or both. However, it indicates the room for maneuver
available to the two parts; close dyads have a better foundation for
forging cooperation than troubled ones. The other way around, the
presence of transnational militancy in a state-to-state relationship, may
suggest—but not always—that it has conflict-prone characteristics.
Besides, whether the current Burmese provision of militant sanctuary is a
result of lack of will or capacity remains somewhat unclear.
Second, the host and target states’ foreign policies vis-à-vis third-party
states, as well as the target state’s perceptions of third-party involvement
in transnational militancy, may serve as drivers for cooperation. This
becomes particularly pertinent if the relation to third-party states is a
matter of overarching strategy.
For India, China represents both a threat at its border and possible
supporter of anti-India militancy. India and China have been involved
in a regional power competition for influence in Myanmar for decades,
and India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Myanmar is permeated by the aim
of countering Chinese influence in its neighborhood.43 China, alongside
Pakistan, is India’s main regional competitor and the perceived threat
from China and Pakistan has formed New Delhi’s nuclear policy, maritime
doctrine, conventional military border preparedness, and involvement
in regional countries. The China complex in India’s strategic thinking has
likely also played a role in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation
because of the heavy Chinese involvement in Myanmar. India and China
are involved with Burmese militants. Myanmar has served the IndoChinese regional power competition for decades, and China has been
accused of supporting anti-India militants in Myanmar.44
Likewise, closer Indo-Burmese military ties serve as a source of
diversification for Naypyidaw in light of periodic deterioration of
otherwise close Sino-Burmese ties. The Tatmadaw is heavily dependent
on weapon imports from China.45 Myanmar’s outlook has been colored
by nationalist sentiments and xenophobia in relations with other states,
including its relations and foreign policies vis-à-vis China and India. Within
this, Naypyidaw has balanced India and China effectively.46 Myanmar
would strategically benefit from balancing the influx of foreign states
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through diversification and is probably also picking and choosing the
most profitable deals because of the competition. An interesting example
of cooperation diversification is Burmese acquisition of an air-search
radar and an anti-submarine warfare sonar from India for use on a frigate
imported from China.47
India’s strategically important Act East Policy, thought of as a
counterweight to China’s BRI, and implies increased Chinese interest in
Myanmar. If India does not succeed in curbing insurgency and unrest in
India’s northeast, the Act East will remain unrealized. The more India in
general can engage and cooperate with Myanmar, the more likely it is that
India gains muscles as a competitor against China and moves closer to
its overarching strategic aims. According to Gautam Sen, who has held a
senior position in a northeast state government, unrest in Indian Nagaland
has decreased. Despite this, the Indian central government has declared
it a disturbed area, which has allowed for continued military presence.48
As the situation between India and China has become increasingly tense
in recent years, it is only to be expected that more security forces will be
deployed in India’s peripheries that are close to China.
Furthermore, a factor that has made India pick up speed is Myanmar’s
opening to the international community. This implies more international
competition in Myanmar, and may contribute to explaining Modi’s push
for more cooperation with Naypyidaw at a time when the international
community is threatening to pull out.
Another incentive for India’s interest in Myanmar is Pakistan’s relations
with Myanmar. Pakistan and China have together supposedly supplied
the Tatmadaw with arms.49 According to Jane’s Defence in June 2017,
Myanmar’s Air Force had ordered Chinese-Pakistani produced JF-17
fighter jets.50 Furthermore, there have been decades-long allegations of
Pakistani support to India-hostile militants in the area. India’s perceptions
of Pakistani and Chinese support of Naga militants in Myanmar can serve
as an incentive for India to engage in counter-terrorism cooperation,
regardless of whether it is a fact. Perceptions of third-party involvement
softens Indian views on Myanmar’s responsibility as a host state, as long
as New Delhi considers Naypyidaw’s provision of sanctuary a result of
lacking capacity. Moreover, Indian cross-border incursion in Myanmar
may partly be intended to signal India’s cross-border military capability.
Beehner argues that India carried out the “surgical strike” across the
Burmese border with an aim to warn archrival Pakistan about its new,
more offensive, military doctrine. This may make sense as the Pakistani
Federal Interior Minister reacted by saying that Pakistan is not Myanmar,
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673
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and that Pakistan would respond to foreign aggression. In addition, India
executed a so-called “surgical strike” into Pakistani territory in late 2016.51
For India, cooperation with Myanmar would be beneficial also in
these terms, as it could point to Chinese and Pakistani involvement in
supporting anti-India separatists. Pakistan is India’s archrival and enjoys
close strategic and economic relations with China. In the coming years,
China aims to invest $62 billion in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC). New Delhi is the primary opponent to CPEC. Had New Delhi
perceived Myanmar as welcoming of Chinese and Pakistani support
of anti-India militants on Burmese territory, it would likely affect the
possibilities of counter-militancy cooperation with Myanmar.
Third, states’ perceptions of the threat and their experience in dealing with
transnational militancy regulate cooperation with other involved parties.
Having experienced resilient transnational militancy, states develop a
consequence consciousness of their possible coercive or cooperative
actions. Even troubled interstate couples may choose more cooperative
counter-measures, even if it is only to avoid intractable interstate conflict.
Moreover, if a host state, after pressure from the target state, is likely to
compel but fail in curbing the militants, the militants may grow stronger
and the host state’s capacity weaker: A so-called compellence dilemma.
This may again cause a deteriorated security situation for the target state.
In such cases, the target state may refrain from coercion and punishment
of the host.52 In addition, counter-militancy cooperation can serve to
de-escalate crises in the form of, for instance, permissive hot pursuits.53
Important to note is that target states’ behavior vis-à-vis host states in
the wake of transnational militancy can at times be explained by triadic
deterrence, meaning that the target state applies threat and punishment
against the host state in order to coerce it into curbing the hostile
transnational militants.54
Furthermore, and importantly, the agenda of the militants and the threat
they pose to the host and target states is central in forming the incentives
for counter-militancy cooperation. Cases where the militants also work
against the interests of the host state indicate low capacity rather than
lack of will of the host state to combat them. This point of departure is
less intimidating than direct support where the host state, for instance,
provides the militants with arms and training facilities. In addition, the
principal conflict-inflicting problem of sanctuary as a condition for militant
organization survival becomes a bit more approachable. The target
state’s perception of the host state’s efforts in curbing the militants is
also important. A total lack of interest from the host state in hindering
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the threat would likely serve as provocation, while at least an intention to
do so may open up for cooperation. The following section examines the
Indo-Burmese dyad in light of security gain assessments and consequence
consciousness considerations regarding transnational militancy.
Internal security is a baseline for India’s counter-militancy cooperation
with Myanmar, as militants have hampered economic development and
inflicted casualties on both soldiers and civilians. Although numbers are
decreasing, there were 3,639 militant incidents in India’s northeast in the
years 2012–2016. One hundred and fifteen security force personnel and
510 civilians were killed in militant violence, and militant groups kidnapped
1,440 individuals.55 Yet the need for improving the security situation in
India’s northeast and Myanmar has been there since the colonial period
and does not alone explain the recent upturn in cooperation. In recent
years, in light of Modi’s Act East policy and increasing conflict with China,
stability in the northeast has moved higher up on the Indian agenda.
What has changed is that India has become more assertive and willing to
actively counter Chinese influence, and that Myanmar is increasingly the
main base for the militants. Moreover, India has successfully expanded
counter-militancy cooperation with Bhutan and Bangladesh, which
are central to stability in the northeast. This may nurture the optimism
concerning similar cooperation with Myanmar.
India has been seeking to seal the Indo-Burmese border without much
success. There was no mutual agreement regarding the border until 1967,
and it has since been semi-demarcated by boundary pillars. In 2013, India
unsuccessfully attempted to build a 10 km border fence.56 According to
debates in the Indian parliament, the Indo-Burmese border issue was still
unresolved as of March 2016. There were still unsettled boundary pillars
and allegations of Burmese constructions on Indian Territory.57
The Tatmadaw may experience additional unrest if it attempts to
curb militants after signing the ceasefire agreement. The security gain
may be higher in tacitly accepting that the Indians breach national
sovereignty, then express anger towards them, than letting it turn into
a less approachable or even intractable conflict.58 Myanmar has a fluid
relationship between its militant groups, private security forces, the
civilian government, and the Tatmadaw. As Paul Staniland notes, in
Myanmar “[t]here is extraordinary diversity in the rules of the game
that structure interactions between state forces and non-state armed
groups.”59 Myanmar’s pragmatic acceptance of cross-border raids signals
that it lacks capacity to fight the militants on its territory. Its lack of
capacity and priorities that far overshadow India-hostile militants, as well
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as a physically difficult mountainous terrain for countering militants, may
outplay India’s wishes in this case. In agreement, Beehner argues that
the main logic behind the consented hot pursuit India conducted across
the Burmese border is that the Tatmadaw is preoccupied with conflict at
other borders and has stretched its capacity. Additionally, in the 2010s the
Rohingya issue in Rakhine state has preoccupied military forces.
In practice, India has largely driven the cooperation. The Burmese have
traditionally not exhibited capacity to curb militant groups enjoying
sanctuary on its territory. They have shown little, if any, will in half-hearted
participation in counter-militancy operations against certain India-hostile
militants. The Tatmadaw has at times directly supported India-hostile
militants, seeing them as an asset in dealing with the Indian government.60
However, this attitude may be changing. Reports from January 2017
indicating that the Burmese are building border fences apparently in
agreement with Indian authorities, demonstrate that the Burmese are
investing more in counter-militancy cooperation with India.61 The Indians
may be reluctant to acknowledge such cooperation keeping in mind
previous local unrest caused by erecting fences. A quick solution to the
problem is to state, “[w]e cannot stop them from constructing fences
on their side.”62 Rather than admitting to failure, such statements may
indicate that the Burmese fencing is in India’s interest. Furthermore, the
Indo-Burmese joint military exercise also indicates genuine cooperation.
In addition, the main agenda of NSCN-K, which has posed the most
significant challenge in recent years, is to fight for an autonomous Naga
state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. It has previously
carried out attacks in both India and Myanmar. NSCN-K has been
designated a terrorist organization by India. In essence, the group’s
original agenda implies that it poses a threat towards India and Myanmar,
both target and host. However, the lack of safe hideouts decreases longterm survivability of transnational militants, which may lead to loose and
complicated agreements between host states and militants. NSCN-K’s
original agenda may contribute to easing counter-militancy cooperation
for the target state, but is complicated by Myanmar’s ceasefire agreement
with the group. As long as India views the Burmese sanctuary as a
question of a lack of capacity to curb the militants, rather than will, it may
serve as a driver of cooperation.
Fourth, if the target state needs to clear the militants out of the way for
reasons of strategic economic development, there is no other way to do
so than to cooperate with the host state.63 This may appear as a possible
scenario after increased incidents of transnational militant attacks have
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become a severe challenge to existing or future economic interests that
require a stabilized region. It may also happen that states take larger
security risks to fulfil strategically important economic cooperation. Thus,
a large economic cooperation potential in a state dyad may create room
for counter-militancy cooperation, especially if the cooperation is of the
strategic type. However, one idea that has been launched argues that
the target state’s micro-level economic-strategic interests may affect
its macro-level interstate conflict behavior towards the host state in the
aftermath of transnational militancy.64 On the other hand, it may be just as
beneficial for the target state to cooperate in order to reach its economic
aims, depending on the character of the state dyad. The following
paragraphs examine the economic cooperation potential in Indo-Burmese
relations and influences counter-militancy cooperation.
Indo-Burmese relations house a great, untapped potential for mutually
beneficial economic cooperation. Militancy is the biggest challenge for
expanding economic and infrastructure cooperation of the strategic sort.65
India’s Act East policy aims to increase economic and infrastructural
connectivity between India’s mainland and South East Asia and
necessarily traverses India’s restless northeast and Myanmar. Main projects
are the $484 million Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport System, the
Sittwe deep-water port, a special economic zone and a proposed natural
gas pipeline, all situated in the Rakhine state. The state is full of natural
resources, and located strategically in the maritime sense at the Bay of
Bengal. Besides, Rakhine state is also at the core of Chinese strategic and
economic interests, as a hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Cross-border trade has remained low because of the high security risk
posed by militants to Indian workers.66 Beyond that, securing Indian
economic-strategic interests in Rakhine state has become more costly
after the outburst of ethnic cleansing and exodus of the minority Rohingya
inhabitants. India, along with China, has been reluctant to condemn
the Tatmadaw’s persecution of the Rohingya, despite the otherwise
in-chorus condemnation from the international community. There are
indications that further development of India’s northeast, implemented
by the central government, would see a heightened risk of insurgency
and militant attacks against workers and infrastructure.67 Turned around,
militancy poses the biggest threat to the success of the Act East Policy.68
Large-scale foreign infrastructure projects in unsettled territory come
with a security price tag, as also seen in China’s economic expansion
abroad. The strategic nature of the economic cooperation potential is
a significant driver in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation and,
more importantly, the region will see no settlement without Burmese
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cooperation. As observed for decades, if the Burmese do not contribute
in curbing the militants, the problem will not go away and economic
cooperation will remain limited.

CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the evolution of Indo-Burmese counter-militancy
cooperation. Resilient transnational militancy challenges are a common
source of conflict between states. Despite continuous transnational
militancy in India and Burma’s ambivalent relations, the two have been
able to forge limited, but growing, counter-militancy cooperation.
A primary driver of increased counter-militancy cooperation is the
overarching strategic aim of a more assertive India to counterbalance
China’s influence in its neighborhood. India is also worried that the
Chinese are lending support to India-hostile militants in Myanmar, which
may feed directly into New Delhi’s wish to engage the Tatmadaw in
advantageous but costly cooperation. Balancing against Chinese influence
is partly done by introducing strategic economic projects in the region
that are viable competitors to Chinese interests and BRI, and partly by
making the stakes of cooperating with India higher for Myanmar through
mutually beneficial strategic security and economic cooperation. The
strategic end aims of the security and economic cooperation respectively
are interlinked. They are also accomplished by supporting Myanmar at a
time when few others are. The key to moving towards materialization of
the Act East Policy is stabilizing India’s northeast and Myanmar.
The target state’s perceptions of the host state’s capacity and efforts
to curb the militants are central in furthering cooperation. In addition,
extraterritorial militants cannot be curbed without cooperation of the
host state. Either because of lack of will or capacity, Naypyidaw and
the Tatmadaw are providing sanctuary to the militants that sustain
transnational militancy – the success factor for transnational militants. By
pragmatic acceptance of Indian hot pursuits across the border, they do
signal lack of capacity rather than will. The perception that the host state
lacks capacity is an enabler for counter-militancy cooperation. The fact
that Naga militants in their primary aim of an autonomous state pose a
threat to both India and Myanmar, eases cooperation and adds to the view
that the Tatmadaw lacks capacity to curb the militants.
From an Indian perspective, engaging Myanmar, in combination with
striking deals with militant groups, has till now proven to be the most
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efficient way of fighting militancy and getting closer to the achieving the
overarching strategic aim of countering Chinese influence in the region.
Existing literature focuses solely on either transnational militancy, stateto-state relations or on state-militant relations within one state. This
case study merges elements from these traditionally divided scholarly
traditions and provides a reminder that target states do not respond to
militancy in a vacuum. More empirical and theoretical studies are needed
to fill this gap.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Saira H. Basit is Research Fellow at the Centre for Asian Security Studies,
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a PhD candidate at the
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.

ENDNOTES
1

Renaud Egreteau, “India’s Ambition in Burma: More Frustration than
Success?,” Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (November/December 2008): 936–957,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2008.48.6.936. For more on the challenges
in Indo-Burmese relations, see Amara Thiha, “The Bumpy Relationship
Between India and Myanmar,” Diplomat August 25, 2017, https://
thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-bumpy-relationship-between-india-andmyanmar/; Pushpita Das, “India-Myanmar Border Problems: Fencing Not
the Only Solution,” IDSA Comment, November 15, 2013, https://idsa.in/
idsacomments/IndiaMyanmarBorderProblems_pdas_151113.

2

Langpoklakpam Suraj Singh, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Greater
Perspective of India’s Look East Policy: Implications on Manipur,” in Look
East Policy and India’s North East: Polemics and Perspectives, ed. Thingnam
Kishan Singh (Manipur: Centre for Alternative Discourse, 2009), 155–176.

3

Lionel M. Beehner, “A Means of First Resort: Explaining ‘Hot Pursuit’ in
International Relations,” Security Studies, (2018): 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080
/09636412.2017.1416815; Annual Reports, Indian Ministry of Defence, 2005–
2017, https://mod.gov.in/documents/annual-report; “India and Myanmar
Strengthen Ties with Exchange Programme on Counterinsurgency Training,”
India Blooms News Service, December 23, 2017, https://www.indiablooms.
com/news-details/N/36715/india-and-myanmar-strengthen-ties-withexchange-programme-on-counter-insurgency-training.html; “India,
Myanmar Strengthen Ties with Counter Insurgency Training,” Sentinel
Assam, December 25, 2017, https://www.sentinelassam.com/2017/12/25/
india-myanmar-strengthen-ties-with-counter-insurgency-training/; and
Suhasini Haidar, “Army Chief Rawat Going into Detail on Myanmar Surgical
Strike Leaves Govt. Redfaced,” Hindu, December 3, 2017, http://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/army-chief-rawats-remarks-on-myanmar-raidleaves-centre-red-faced/article21255413.ece?homepage=true.

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673

88

Basit: India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of Transnational Militant Threats
India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of Transnational Militant Threats

4

For examples of literature that shaped the selection of driver categories,
see Egreteau, “India’s Ambition in Burma;” Rajiv Bhatia, India-Myanmar
Relations. Changing Contours (New Delhi, London & New York: Routledge,
2016); Sushil Kumar Sharma, “Insurgency in North-East India: External
Dynamics,” Journal of Defence Studies 8, no. 4 (2014): 111–131; Idean
Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); David B. Carter, “The
Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups,”
International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2015): 461–464, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/isqu.12192; Navin A. Bapat, “The Escalation of Terrorism:
Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict,” International Interactions 40,
no. 4 (2014): 568–578, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.902818
; Todd Sandler & Walter Enders, “Economic Consequences of Terrorism
in Developed and Developing Countries: an Overview,” in Terrorism,
Economic Development, and Political Openness, eds. Philip Keefer &
Norman Loayza (World Bank), (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17–47.

5

Rajiv Bhatia, India-Myanmar Relations, 122; Adarsh Vijay, “India and
Myanmar: Prospects of Maritime Reciprocity,” National Maritime
Foundation, February 13, 2018, http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20
Profile/636540793561642770.pdf.

6

Association for Southeast Asian Nations. Myanmar is part of ASEAN.

7

“To Counter China, India Pushes East,” Stratfor Worldview, November 10,
2017. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/counter-china-india-pusheseast.

8

See for instance Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders; Carter, “The Compellence
Dilemma:” Boaz Atzili & Wendy Pearlman, “Triadic Deterrence: Coercing
Strength, Beaten by Weakness,” Security Studies 21, no. 2 (2012): 301–355,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.679209; Beehner, “A Means of
First Resort.”

9

Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders.

10

See for instance Bapat, “The Escalation of Terrorism.”

11

Salehyan argues that border and countermilitancy cooperation regimes
in cases of transnational militancy are rare and costly. Idean Salehyan,
Transnational Insurgencies and the escalation of regional conflict: lessons
for Iraq and Afghanistan, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, http://
publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2056.pdf.

12

“Annual report 2016–17,” Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, https://mha.gov.in/
sites/default/files/anual_report_18082017.pdf.

13

Singh, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Greater Perspective,” 165.

14

Vijay Sakhuja, “India and Myanmar: Choices for Military Cooperation,” Indian
Council of World Affairs, September 11, 2012: 2, http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/
IBindiamyanmar.pdf; Sunniva Engh, “India’s Myanmar Policy and the ‘SinoIndian Great Game’,” Asian Affairs 47, no. 1 (2016): 34–38, http://dx.doi.org
/10.1080/03068374.2015.1130307.

15

Das, “India-Myanmar Border Problems.”

16

Engh, “India’s Myanmar Policy.”

17

D.B. Shekatkar, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland” in India and
Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, eds. Sumit Ganguly & David P. Fidler
(Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2009), 24; Beehner, “A Means of First
Resort,” 22; Engh, “India’s Myanmar Policy,” 41; Sakhuja, “India and Myanmar.”

Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018
ISSN: 1944-0464
eISSN: 1944-0472

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018

89

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2

18

See Annual Reports 2003–2017, Indian Ministry of Defence, https://mod.gov.
in/documents/annual-report.

19

SIPRI Arms Trade Register, February 19, 2018, http://armstrade.sipri.org/
armstrade/page/trade_register.php.

20

“Border Trade,” Indian Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region,
http://www.mdoner.gov.in/content/border-trade#d.

21

Beehner, “A Means of First Resort.”

22

Ministry of Home Affairs, “Union Home Minister Chairs Meeting to
Review Indo-Myanmar Border Issues,” June 12, 2017, Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.
aspx?relid=165583.

23

Beehner, “A Means of First Resort.”

24

See the Annual Reports, Indian Ministry of Defence, 2005–2017, https://mod.
gov.in/documents/annual-report.

25

India Blooms News Service, “India and Myanmar Strengthen Ties with
Exchange Programme;” and Sentinel Assam, “India, Myanmar Strengthen
Ties.”

26

Haidar, “Army Chief Rawat.”

27

Subir Bhaumik, “Look East Through Northeast: Challenges and Prospects
for India,” Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper 52 (June
2014), 21, http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/
OccasionalPaper_51.pdf.

28

Bibhu Prasad Routray, “State of Play: Insurgencies in India’s Northeast,”
Mantraya Analysis 21, February 19, 2018, http://mantraya.org/analysis-stateof-play-insurgencies-in-indias-northeast/.

29

Alex Waterman, “Marriages of Insurgent Convenience Along the IndoMyanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge,” IDSA, August 10, 2017, http://
www.idsa.in/idsacomments/marriages-of-insurgent-convenience-alongthe-indo-myanmar-border_awaterman_100817.

30

Access to foreign sanctuaries is a precondition for the survival of militant
organizations. See Salehyan, “Transnational Insurgencies;” Idean
Salehyan, “No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict,”
Journal of Politics 70, no. 1 (January 2008): 54–66. A valid example of
insurgency success based on access to sanctuary is Pakistan’s sheltering
of the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network. See Stephen Metz,
“Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Toward a More Efficient Antiterrorism
Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Security 10, no. 4 (2017): 66, http://dx.doi.
org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.4.1648.

31

“Myanmar Asks China for Help to Stop ‘Terrorist’ Attacks,” February 19,
2015, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31542976; Salehyan,
Transnational Insurgencies, 14.

32

Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth about India’s Militant Strike in
Myanmar,” Diplomat, June 12, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/thetruth-about-indias-militant-strike-in-myanmar/. India and the NSCN-K had
been in a ceasefire arrangement since 2001.

33

Jamie Tarabay, “Myanmar’s Military: the Power Aung San Suu Kyi Can’t
Control,” CNN, December 6, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/21/asia/
myanmar-military-the-real-power/index.html.

34

Kayleigh Long & Wa Lone, “Government Denies India Operation Took Place
Inside Myanmar,” Myanmar Times, June 11, 2015, https://www.mmtimes.
com/national-news/14978-government-denies-india-operation-took-placeinside-myanmar.html.

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673

90

Basit: India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of Transnational Militant Threats
India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of Transnational Militant Threats

35

Haidar, “Army Chief Rawat.”

36

Hot pursuit is when a target state temporarily violates the host state’s
sovereign borders in pursuit of militants. Beehner, “A Means of First
Resort.”

37

Beehner, “A Means of First Resort,” 22–23.

38

“Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,” burmalibrary.
org, September 2008, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_
Constitution-2008-en.pdf.

39

Vijaita Singh, “India May Ask Myanmar to End Ceasefire With NSCN(K),”
Hindu, June 26, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-mayask-myanmar-to-end-ceasefire-with-nscnk/article19150631.ece.

40

Conversation with high-standing BJP official, 2017.

41

Rumel Dahiya, “Operation Golden-Bird: Revisiting Counter-Insurgency on the
India-Myanmar Border,” Journal of Defence Studies 10, no. 3 (2016): 5–20.

42

Salehyan, Transnational Insurgencies.

43

Engh, “India’s Myanmar Policy.”

44

David I. Steinberg, “Myanmar as Nexus: Sino-Indian Rivalries on the Frontier,”
Terrorism 16, no.1 (1993), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576109308435915;
Bibhu Prasad Routray, “China’s New Great Game in India’s Northeast,”
Mantraya, no. 15, July 4, 2017, http://mantraya.org/analysis-chinas-newgame-in-indias-northeast/.

45

Beehner, “A Means of First Resort,” 20; On the downfall of Sino-Burmese
relations, see Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “The March 2015 Bombings of Yunnan
and the Decline in Sino-Myanmar Relations,” Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no. 14
(2015), http://apjjf.org/-Alvin-Cheng-Hin-Lim/4305/article.pdf.

46

Engh, “India’s Myanmar Policy,” 50.

47

“SIPRI Arms Trade,” 2018.

48

Gautam Sen, “Continuance of Declaration on Disturbed Area in Nagaland
is a Decision Based on Perception Without Foresight,” IDSA Comment,
January 16, 2018, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/continuance-ofdeclaration-on-disturbed-area-in-nagaland_gsen_160117.

49

Steinberg, “Myanmar as Nexus”: 5; Hein Kiessling, Faith, Unity, Discipline: the
ISI of Pakistan (Oxford University Press, 2016), 162.

50

“Images Show Myanmar Air Force JF-17/FC-1 Conducting Flight Tests in
China,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 14, 2017, http://www.janes.com/
article/71422/images-show-myanmar-air-force-jf-17-fc-1-conducting-flighttests-in-china.

51

Irfan Haider, “Pakistan is Not Myanmar, Will Respond to Foreign Aggression,
Nisar Tells India,” Dawn, June 10, 2015, https://www.dawn.com/
news/1187363.

52

Carter, “The Compellence Dilemma.”

53

Beehner, “A Means of First Resort,” 17

54

Atzili & Pearlman, “Triadic Deterrence.”

55

Many of these violent actions were conducted by militants residing in Myanmar.

Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018
ISSN: 1944-0464
eISSN: 1944-0472

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018

91

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2

56

Das, “India-Myanmar Border Problems.”

57

“Need to Find a Permanent Solution to Indo-Myanmar Boundary Dispute,”
16th Lok Sabha (the lower house of India’s parliament), March 15, 2016,
http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/Result16.aspx?dbsl=7273; “Need
to Solve the Problem Regarding Fencing Along Indo-Myanmar Border,”
16th Lok Sabha, March 9, 2016, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/
Result16.aspx?dbsl=7521.

58

Beehner, “A Means of First Resort,” 20.

59

Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents and Wartime Political Orders,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (June 2012): 243–264, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S1537592712000655.

60

Egreteau, “India’s Ambition in Burma,” 940, 947–948.

61

“Myanmar Border Fencing Alarms India,” Indian Express, January 25, 2017,
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/myanmar-border-fencing-alarmsindia-4490325/.

62

“Myanmar Border Fencing,” Indian Express.

63

Salehyan, Rebels Without borders; Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries. Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

64

Bapat: “The Escalation of Terrorism.”

65

Bhaumik, “Look East Through Northeast.”

66

Engh, “India’s Myanmar Policy;” 48.

67

See for instance, Snehashish Mitra & Ranabir Samaddar, “India’s Look East
Policy and the Northeast: Bridging Spaces or Widening Schisms?,” Wire,
January 7, 2017, https://thewire.in/97491/bridging-spaces-wideningschisms-look-east-policy-northeast/

68

Bhaumik, “Look East Through Northeast.”

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673

92

